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The Maine courts hold a gratuitous bailee to reasonable or ordinary care.15 In the case of Maddock v. Riggs, it was held that:
"The so-called distinction between a slight, ordinary and
gross negligence, over which the courts have quibbled for a hundred years can furnish no assistance with respect to the gratuitous
bailment involved."
In this case and in the case of Xubli v. First Natl. Bank,21 affirmed in
later appeal,2 it was pointed out that the three degrees of care and of
negligence were no longer recognized in that state.
The Kentucky court apparently recognizes two degrees of negligence, gross and ordinary negligence.S Ordinary negligence is defined
as the failure to exercise that care which ordinary prudent persons
would exercise in like or similar circumstances.10
In concluding, keeping in mind the observations made above, it
appears apt and suitable to a practical end, to dispense with the use of
the two degrees of negligence, gross and ordinary, recognized by, the
Kentucky courts. Ordinary negligence includes and is concurrent with
gross negligence. The term gross negligence is actually surplusage.
Many courts do not use the term "gross negligence" in fixing the
liability of a gratuitous bailee, obviously realizing the futility of its
application. The broad rule or doctrine, that a person is bound to
exercise that degree of care which a reasonable prudent man would
use under similar circumstances, would suffice.
JoN A. Evxs.
CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY

OF EVIDENCE OF

TRAILING BY BLOODHOUNDS
In 1932, late one afternoon, a person was going home from work,
and, as he passed a cabin on the road, he was felled by a charge of
shotgun pellets. Twenty-four hours after the killing a bloodhound
followed a trail from the cabin to that of another person some two
miles away. This latter person was made the defendant in a prosecution for murder, and was convicted in the county court upon circumstantial evidence, which was mainly that furnished by the bloodhound. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals the lower court was reversed for error in the admission of incompetent evidence. The quali' 124 Me. 75, 126 Atl. 180 (1924); Whiting v. Whiting, 111 Me. 13,
87 AtI. 381 (1913).
2*Supra, Note 8.
"'Supra,Note 9.
199 Ia. 194, 200 N. W. 434 (1924).
1 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. BroWn, 186 Ky. 435, 217 S. W. 686
(1919).
W upra, Note 29; Golubic v. Rasnick, 239 Ky. 355, 39 S. W. (2d)
513 (1931); Jackson's Admrs. v. Cose, 239 Ky. 754, 40 S. W. (2d) 343
(1931).
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4
fications of the dog had not been shown, under the rule' of the Kentucky cases.
The defendant was tried again for the same offense, and In 1933
there was a second appeal of the case, and a ground of alleged error
was the admission of incompetent evidence. The owner of the dog
had testified that he possessed a certificate of pedigree of the dog's
mother but not of its father; that he owned both the father and the
mother of the dog and had purchased them as full-blooded pedigreed
dogs; that at the time he purchased the father, the owner represented
to him that the dog was a pedigreed full-blooded strain of bloodhound; that he had reared and trained the dog. He testified as to
his own knowledge of the pedigree, the method used in training the
dog, the length of time it had been trained, and its aptness, accuracy,
experience, qualifications, and dependability. Under this showing
the Court of Appeals affirmed the action taken in the court below and
held that the testimony satisfied the rule governing the admission
of bloodhound evidence.
Fiction contains accounts of the mysterious feats of animals, but
nowhere Is there such an uncanny ability shown as in the case of
trailing by dogs. For centuries the dog has afforded much sport to
the hunter in running down game, pointing birds, and retrieving. But
other animals have not been the only quarry of dogs. The uncanny
nose of the dog has been put to use in tracking man as well.
Although all dogs are generally thought of as being able to trail,
they seem to vary as to their ability'. Perhaps it is a matter of intelligence or keenness" of scent. However, it is known that some
trail by sight and others by scent. For example, the greyhound and
the deerhound are sight trailing dogs, while on the other hand the
true hound such as the bloodhound, foxhound and staghound are scent
trailing. It has been said that "The bloodhound has the keenest scent
of all dogs.'" The bloodhound, or blooded hound, is an animal which
readily learns to trail human beings. During the slave days, bloodhounds as well as Cuban bloodhounds were used for tracking down
escaped slaves. Stories of incidents as portrayed in Uncle Tom's
I "In Kentucky it is settled that testimony as to trailing by bloodhounds of one charged with crime, may be permitted to go to the
jury for what it is worth, as one of the circumstances which may tend
to connect the defendant with the crime only after it has been shown
by some one having personal knowledge of the facts (a) that the dog
in question is of pure blood and of a stock characterized by acuteness
of scent and power of discrimination; (b) it itself possessed of these
qualities and has been trained or tested in the tracking of human beings; and (c) that the dog so trained and tested was laid on the
trail, whether visible or not, at the point where the circumstances
tend clearly to show that the guilty party had been, or upon a track
which such circumstances indicated had been made by him." Blair v.
Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 319, 188 S. W. 390 (1916).
'Bullock v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 789, 45 S. W. (2d) 449 (1932);
249 Ky. 1, 60 S. W. (2d) 108 (1933).
"Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th Edition, Vol. 7, p. 497.
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Cabin are well known. There seems to be "common knowledge that
dogs may be trained to follow the tracks of a human being with considerable certainty and accuracy."'
"O'er all, the bloodhound boasts superior skill,
To scent, to view, to turn and boldly killHis fellows' vain'alarm rejects with scorn,
True to the master's voice and learned horn;His nostrils oft, if ancient fame sings true,
Traced the sly felon thro' the tainted dew,
Once snuff'd, he follows with unaltered aim,
Nor odours lure him from the chosed game;
Deep-mouthed, he thunders and inflamed he views,
5
Springs on relentless, and to death pursues."
Just how does the bloodhound follow the human trail? A scientific statement of the process would be that "It is a 'theory' that microscopic particles of effluvia emanate constantly from the body of every
living human being, and that these particles possess an odor characteristic of the particular individual. It is supposed that the highly
developed olfactory nerves of a bloodhound enable him to detect the
peculiar odor of these particles, and thus to follow the 'trail' of any
particular person."6
There have been numerous cases in which the question of bloodhound evidence has arisen, and most of them have been in the South.
The earliest reported case presenting the question of whether evidence
of trailing by bloodhounds is admissible is Hodge v. State,' decided In
1893, in which the evidence was held admissible. Since that date
there have grown majority and minority views. Most courts in which
the question has been presented take the position that upon a proper
foundation being laid by proof that the dogs were qualified to trail
human beings and that the circumstances surrounding the trailing
were such as to make it probable that the person trailed was the
guilty party, such evidence is admissible. The following jurisdictions
favor thi view that the trailing of a person by dogs is admissible as
evidence: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia.8
Thus the
4
Hodge v. State, 98 Ala. 10, 13 So. 385, 39 Am. St. Rep. 17 (1893).
$McWhorter, Boodhound as a Witness (1920) 54 Am. L. R. 109.
' State v. Grba, 196 Iowa 241, 194 N. W. 250 (1923).
" 98 Ala. 10, 13 So. 385, 39 Am. St. Rep. 17-.
8 Loper v. State, 205 Ala. 216, 87 So. 92 (1920); Holub v. State,
116 Ark. 227, 172 S. W. 878 (1915); Davis v. State, 46 Fla. 137, 35 So.
76 (1903); Troup v. State, 26 Ga. App. 623, 107 N. E. 75 (1921); State
v. Adams, 85 Kans. 435, 116 Pac. 608 (1911); Bullock v. Com., 249 Ky.
1, 60 S. W. (2d) 108 (1933); State v. Davis, 154 La. 295, 97 So. 449
(1923); Harris v. State, 143 Miss. 102, 108 So. 446 (1926); State v.
Freyer, 330 Mo. 62, 42 S. W. (2d) 894 (1932); State v. McLeod, 198 N.
Car. 649, 152 S. E. 895 (1930); State v. Dickerson, 77 Ohio St. 34, 82
N. E. 969 (1907); Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 52 Pa. Super. 272 (1913);
State v. Brown, 103 S. Car. 437, 88 S. E. 21 (1916); Copley v. State,
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Southern states are almost unanimous in their approval of the bloodhound evidence.
Jurisdictions holding the minority view that bloodhound evidence
is not admissible are Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa.'
The reason for allowing the admission of bloodhound evidence is
largely a matter of common knowledge and experience that a bloodhound with proper qualifications can trail a human being. In opposition to its admission several arguments have been made.
In the first place, it is said that, due to the many variable factors
involved, the evidence is too uncertain and unreliable to warrant its
admission in the trial of a criminal case.10 But, for that matter, the
case against a criminal is usually circumstantial, and the jury must
weigh the circumstantial facts. Would it not be well to allow the
jury to determine the weight to be given this evidence?
Then it is stated that the jury would be likely to give the evidence more weight than it is entitled to receive." It may be admitted
that people regard the actions of animals with superstitious awe, but
on the other hand can It not also be said that their regard for the
testimony of humans is influenced largely by'the human element? The
superstitious regard for the animal should be no more a bar to the
evidence than the emotional regard for a human witness.
Also, it is said that the life and liberty of a free citizen ought not
to be put in jeopardy on the testimony of dogs. Such a contention was
upheld in the leading minority case. 2 We ask why not? as the reason
is begging the question, and add that the testimony involved is not
only that of the dog, bbt of the person working him, since that is
necessary in admitting the evidence.
Another reason given for its rejection is that the defendant cannot cross-examine the dogs.UA The answer usually made to this objection is that the witness is not the bloodhound, but the person testifying as to the bloodhound's acts."
Another objection is that the defendant is deprived of his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. But the witness
153 Tenn. 189, 281 S. W. 460 (1926); Parker v. State, 46 Tex. Crim.
Rep. 461, 80 S. W. 1008 (1904); State v. McKinney, 88 W. Va. 400,
106 S. E. 894 (1921).
'People v. Pfanschmidt, 262 Illinois 411, 104 N. E. 804 (1914);
Ruse v. State, 186 Ind. 237, 115 N. E. 778 (1917); State v. Grba, 196
Iowa 241, 194 N. W. 250 (1923); Brott v. State, 70 Nebr. 395, 97 N. W.
597 (1903).
"Ruse v. State, 186 Ind. 237, 115 N. E. 778 (1917).
11"It is well known that the exercise of a mysterious power not
possessed by human beings begets in the minds of many people a
superstitious awe, like that inspired by the bleeding of a corpse at the
touch of the supposed murderer, and that they see in such an exhibition a direct interposition of divine providence in aid of human justice." Pedigo v. Com., 103 Ky. 41, 44 S. W. 143 (1898).
" State v. Grba, 196 Iowa 241, 194 N. W. 250 (1923).
2ATbi.
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is not the bloodhound, but the person testifying as to 'What the bloodhound did.
Often the courts will reject the evidence on the ground of its
weakness. Even if we assume that such evidence is not of much
weight, should it be rejected on that account alone? "Instinct is not
unerring, neither is reason. The mere weakness of evidence does not
make it incompetent.""
An example of where a court refused to
allow bloodhound evidence on the ground of its weakness is the
Pfanschmidt case.4A It may be said that just because the testimony
was weak in the particular case because of the lack of precautionary
measures and favorable circumstances, a court should not say that
bloodhound evidence is never admissible.m
No court holds that such evidence is admissible without the proper
precautions. And even then, when it is admitted, the courts concede
that such evidence is to be accepted with caution, and is not under
any circumstances to be regarded as conclusive of guilt. It is generally held that this class of evidence is not sufficient of itself to support a conviction."
The evidence has been compared to expert testimony, which Is
one of the weakest kinds of testimony."'
There are four leading cases which hold to the minority view.
State v. Grba', was a murder case in which the defendant was charged
with having dynamited the deceased as he was emerging from a
garage. Bloodhounds followed a trail to certain excavations and a
steamshovel where defendant's clothes were found. The dogs were
taken to the jail where they picked out the defendant.
Brott v. StateP was an indictment for burglary. The trail had
been walked across by persons at least a hundred times. The court
said that bloodhound evidence was "unsafe evidence, and both reason
and instinct condemn it." That "the sleuthhound of fiction is a
marvelous dog, but we find nothing quite like him in real life." But if
the case were properly put to the jury so that they could consider the
fact that the trail had been "muddied" time and again, would there
be injustice? Shouldn't it be allowed for what it is worth?
Peop7e v. Pfanschmidt" was a case where a family was burned to
death in their home. More than thirty hours after the crime dgs
were put on the trail of a horse and followed a circuitous route to tlhe
stables of the place where the defendant was staying, and lay down
beside a certain horse-the horse that drew the defendant's buggy. The
3State
v. Davis, 154 La. 295, 97 So. 449 (1923).
"Dissent
of State v. Grba, 196 Iowa 241, 194 N. W. 250 (1923).
4
A 262 Ill. 411, 104 N. E. 804 (1914).
"Note, 63 Pa. L. R. 42-44.
Is Myers v. Com., 194 Ky. 523, 240 S. W. 71 (1922); State v. Freyer,
330 Mo. 62, 48 S. W. (2d) 894 (1932).
"Myers v. Com., 194 Ky. 523, 240 S. W. 71 (1922).
u 196 Iowa 241, 194 N. W. 250 (1926).
"270 Nebr. 395, 97 N. W. 597 (1903).
262 Ill. 411, 104 N. E..804 (1914).
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court held that the bloodhound evidence was inadmissible to show
trailing of a horse, and said that it could not be used to show the
trailing of a human.
In Ruse v. Statea the court held that evidence of trailing by bloodhounds was inadmissible, saying that since the use of bloodhounds is
uncertain and may readily lead to the conviction of the innocent, and
since such evidence is not of great probative value, then reason and inistinct condemn its reception in a criminal case as proof of guilt.
It Is submitted that in each of the above minority cases the courts
were confusing weight with admissibility of evidence, and that the
unsuitable conditions for traling should discount the weight of the
evidence but not bar it entirely.
In Kentucky there have been twelve reported cases in which the
Court of Appeals has decided upon the admission of evidence of trailIng of bloodhounds. The first case was the Peigo case in 1898, which
laid down the rules which thereafter have been followed by the Kentucky courts. Also, this case has furnished the basis of many decisions in other jurisdictions, as it is often cited as a basic case upon
the problem. It involved the burning of a stock barn. At noon on
the day following the burning bloodhounds were put on the trail. The
evidence of their trailing was not admitted in this case, but the court
said that it is admissible when certain rules are complied with. A
person who has personal knowledge of the facts must testify that the
dog was of pure blood, and of stock characterized by acuteness of
scent and power of discrimination, and that the dog possessed these
qualities, and that it had been trained and tested to track human
beings.
The case of Allen v. CommonweZth'3 was a murder case in which
there was no showing that the dogs used in trailing measured up to
the requirements enumerated in the Pedigo case.
Dunham v. Commonwealth'" was a case of assault with intent to
kill. The owner of the dogs used in trailing testified that they were
of good breeding, the sire of one being a pure bloodhound, and the
grandsire an English bloodhound trained in tracking men; that they
were carefully trained in tracking men, and the older one had aided
In the capture of 63 criminals, being assisted in several of those cases
by the younger dog; that the dogs reached the situs of the crime on the
same night it was committed; that their heads were held up until they
were put to the trail, which they followed. The rules for admission
were satisfied.
,S'prouse v. Commonwealthz was a murder case in which proper
qualifications and working of the dogs were not sufficiently shown to
render the evidence competent under the rules of the earlier cases.
186 Ind. 237, 115 N. E. 778 (1917).
103 Ky. 41, 44 S. W. 143.
-'- Ky. -, 82 S. W. 589 (1904).
119 Ky. 508, 84 S. W. 538 (1905).
21132 Ky. 269, 116 S. W. 344 (1909).
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Blair v. Uom-monwealthk was an indictment for housebreaking.
The bloodhound evidence offered was held inadmissible, as the reliability of the dogs was not shown.
In Myers v. Uommonwealt7l involving arson in the burning of a
barn, the bloodhound evidence was admitted. The court did caution as
to its use, saying that its effect should be restricted, comparing it to
expert testimony.
8rings v. Commonweazlth& was a barn burning case. As no objection was made in the court below to the admission of the bloodhound evidence, the court presumed it to be competent.
The case of Hays v. Commonwealth'O also had to do with the burning of a barn. The bloodhound evidence was not admissible as there
was not a sufficient showing of pedigree and qualifications.
In Stidham v. Commonwealth'O the bloodhound evidence was admitted, as there was a showing that the hounds were pure bred and
had been found accurate in the tracking of human beings.
Alsept v. Commonwealt/3u was an arson case, in which the bloodhound evidence was admissible under the rule.
In 1932 and 1933 came the Bullockc' case discussed in the beginning. This case is in. line with all of the Kentucky authorities.
This is the latest reported Kentucky case directly upon the problem, except the recent case of Kelly v. Commonwoealth g which was
decided in 1935. It was a murder case in which bloodhound evidence
was admitted, no question being made as to whether such evidence is
admissible in Kentucky. Included in the dictum was a statement that
testimony that "something like two hundred confessions from their
trailing was inadmissible to show the skill of the dogs, or for any
other purpose."
In summary, we shall say that the evidence of trailing by bloodhounds, by the great weight of authority, is admissible under proper
showing of the qualifications and performance. All of the Southern
states except Virginia certify its competence. Kentucky, starting with
the Pedigo case in 1893, has maintained that such evidence Is admissible. Despite the objections that the bloodhound is not an unfailing Nemesis, as a matter of practice the evidence is admissible for
what It is worth.
GoEuon T. SxmNsu.
171 Ky.
194 Ky.
198 Ky.
,211 Ky.
'221 Ky.
240 Ky.
241 Ky.
108 (1933).
259 Ky.

319, 188 S. W. 390 (1916).
523, 240 S. W. 71 (1922).
258, 248 S. W. 535 (1923).
716, 277 S. W. 1004 (1925).
49, 297 S. W. 929 (1927).
395, 42 S. W. (2d) 517 (1931).
789, 45 S. W. (2d) 449 (1932); 249 Ky. 1, 60 S. W. (2d)
770, 83 S..W. (2d) 489.

